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Abstract: Recurrent crises in corporate governance have created policy pressure for greater 
attention to the effectiveness of boards. Since the 1990s there have been calls for boards to 
undertake regular self-evaluation. Since 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code has 
urged large corporations to engage outside parties to conduct such appraisals at least every 
three years, a move other jurisdictions have copied. Despite its importance, little research has 
been conducted into processes or outcomes of board evaluation. This study explores the 
attitudes of directors on board evaluation, whether self-administered or facilitated by others. 
We interviewed 17 directors with some 50 listed-company board appointments between 
them. Even though their companies fall below the threshold specified in policy, all undertake 
board self-evaluations and evaluations using professional facilitators. We find broad 
acceptance of the principle and recognition of the value of board evaluation. We also find 
some acceptance amongst those directors who have implemented external evaluation of the 
benefits of using outside facilitators. Their evaluation of the evaluation process points 
towards a need to professionalise the practice of outside facilitation, and to conduct research 
into the skills and knowledge needed and the processes used.  
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Introduction 
In the wake of the corporate governance failings in the early 2000s, policy in many 
countries has pushed for corporations to conduct regular and systematic reviews of the 
performance of their boards of directors. Many companies complied: some boards conducted 
self- and peer-evaluation; at others the chair conducted more or less formal appraisal of 
fellow directors and the board as a whole. Following the financial crisis later that decade, 
and with renewed vigour, the emphasis has swung towards the use of external facilitators to 
bring impartiality and expertise to the process.  
The idea has a long and wide pedigree. The Toronto Stock Exchange recommended the 
evaluations for listed company boards as far back as 1994 (Cadbury, 1999). The New York 
Stock Exchange requires annual, internally conducted board and committee evaluations as 
part of its corporate governance guidelines (NYSE, 2014). Professional advisory firms in a 
variety of countries recommend it (e.g., in India; see Deloitte, 2014). Board evaluation 
became policy in the UK with publication of the version of the Combined Code (FRC, 2003) 
that followed the Higgs Review (2003). Initially the code urged annual evaluations in some 
form, and later (FRC, 2010) came a recommendation that external facilitators lead the 
process at least every three years, rather than relying only on internally conducted 
evaluations.  
Directors acknowledge the value of evaluations, though with reservations. A survey by 
the accountancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2014) found that 91% of directors felt 
their self-evaluation programmes were at least somewhat effective, though 70% said they 
had trouble being frank.  
Despite this wide interest from practitioners and policymakers, empirical research in 
board evaluation is still quite limited. The sensitivity of the subject matter, combined with 
much discussed problems of penetrating the “black box” of corporate boards (Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007), mean that access to both the process and outcomes of board evaluations is 
difficult. 
This paper lifts that veil a little higher by exploring in-depth the attitudes of directors 
who have undergone the process of evaluation. Our concern is in understanding what 
participants in the process find to be the relative advantages and drawback of self-evaluation 
techniques and those when an external advisor leads the process. In doing so we illuminate 
questions concerning the purposes, timing and substance of each type and develop ideas for 
further research to substantiate these tentative findings.  
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Our study contributes to our knowledge of board evaluations in the following ways: It 
shows acceptance, sometimes grudging, among directors that external evaluation of boards 
can add value by picking up on interpersonal dynamics that self-evaluation exercises seem to 
overlook. This acceptance validates that broad policy direction in codes and listing rules, in 
the UK and elsewhere, to mandate at least occasional use of external facilitators in larger 
firms. Acknowledgement of that value, even among companies that are not bound by such 
institutional or policy pressure, also points a likely demand for services, highlighting a need 
for a professionalisation of service providers, and for research to develop a better 
understanding of the overlaps, complementarities, and limitations of both board self-
evaluation and exercises facilitated by outsiders. 
The balance of the paper is organised as follows. To set the scene, we sketch the market 
and institutional context in which calls for board evaluation became so strong. We then 
review the growing but still modest literature on board evaluation, differentiating between 
normative and empirical studies to identify the limitations of current knowledge of the field. 
After a discussion of methods, we then report on interviews with 17 directors of a variety of 
companies operating broadly under the guidance of British law and regulation. All 
respondents are seasoned directors, most with multiple directorships totalling nearly 200 
listed, private and subsidiary companies, and many undertook evaluations of both broad 
styles. We then discuss the implications of their views for the process of evaluation, 
identifying different functions the two types can serve and different processes they might 
follow, as well as avenues for further research. 
Despite the limitations of this small-scale study, it offers reasons to question some of the 
well-intended policy prescriptions in recent years and to build evidence for future 
policymaking. In so doing, it provides a basis for thinking that boards might use more 
extensively the discretion they have under the “comply-or-explain” provisions of codes like 
the UK Corporate Governance Code to experiment with other approaches to board 
evaluation.  
Market and institutional context 
Poor board performance has long been mooted as the source of corporate governance 
lapses. Agency theorists identified lax controls on senior management as contributing to both 
the rises in executive pay and the lack of concentration of shareholder value in the 1970s, 
especially in the United States (Eisenhardt, 1989;Fama, 1980;Ross, 1973). This theorising 
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led to normative conclusions including stronger and more independent boards of directors 
and greater shareholder scrutiny (Roe, 1994;Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Professional bodies, 
including the National Association of Corporate Directors in the US (NACD, 2001), and 
stock exchanges like Toronto recommended some form of board appraisal to safeguard 
against lazy directors (Leblanc, 2002). Nonetheless such urging met with considerable 
resistance among directors (Ingley and van der Walt, 2002). 
The collapse of major corporations, particularly but not exclusively in the US, in the 
2000–2002 period led to policy demands for action. In a widely copied initiative in the UK, 
the government-sponsored Higgs Review (2003) recommended annual, formal evaluations 
of the board as a whole, committees, and individual directors, adding that using outside 
facilitators “can bring objectivity” (2003). As incorporated in a new version of the Combined 
Code (FRC, 2003), the recommendation became one of annual evaluations but the main 
body of the code did not mention external facilitation. These provisions were subject to the 
voluntary “comply-or-explain” regime in UK corporate governance. Uptake was initially 
tentative.  
That changed, however, after the financial crisis of 2007–2009, in which one small bank 
was nationalised and two large ones part-nationalised. One of the large ones, the Royal Bank 
of Scotland, had transformed itself through aggressive national and international acquisitions 
into the largest bank in the world. Its failure shook policymakers into actions (FSA, 2011) 
which included a new UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010) that urged annual 
evaluations and externally-led ones at least once every three years. Acceptance of these 
provisions grew steadily (cf. Grant Thornton, 2011, 2016). 
The UK policy move caught the spirit of the time, and authorities in many jurisdictions 
put pressure on corporate boards to undertake some form of self-assessment or use external 
consultants to examine the performance of boards, committees and individual directors. In 
contrast to the widespread interest in practice and policy, the subject has received relatively 
little scholarly attention and even less empirical research. 
Board evaluation theory and evidence 
Boards work as groups, and, despite the efforts of directors to keep their deliberations as 
rational as possible, emotions often get involved (Bodolica and Spraggon, 2011;Brundin and 
Nordqvist, 2008). Issues of group psychology arise, including groupthink (Janis, 
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1972;Maharaj, 2008), which can cast doubt over the quality of self-perception and awareness 
(Bollich, Rogers and Vazire, 2015;Church, 1997;Duval and Lalwani, 1999).  
Moreover, boards are notoriously difficult to research. They deal with confidential 
material, often of a commercially sensitive nature. They are populated by business elites 
more accustomed to giving rather than receiving appraisals, let alone having researchers 
examine them in the process. The “black box” of the boardroom is a phrase used in studies 
(Huse, 2005;Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007;Rost and Osterloh, 2010;Zona and Zattoni, 2007) 
to explain why more rigorous information collection is not possible.  
As a result, and despite the importance of the topic in practice and public policy, the 
literature on board evaluation is still at an early stage of development.1 Even now much of 
what we find in academic journals is practical advice, rather than detailed analysis or 
theorising.  
One of the earliest publications came from Conger, Finegold and Lawler (1998), who 
argued in the practitioner-oriented Harvard Business Review that appraising the board can 
improve board/management relations. Their assertions arose from interviews with directors 
at a dozen companies they termed pioneers of the practice.  
An early scholarly analysis came from van der Walt and Ingley (2000), who identified 
differences in approach in New Zealand between inside, executive directors and external, 
non-executives, examining factors they saw as important in assessing board effectiveness. 
Ingley and van der Walt (2002) went on to identify the political aspects of board evaluation, 
including why some boards undertook evaluations but also reasons for their resistance to 
evaluation processes. Among their concerns was a fear the process would upset the cohesion 
and trust needed for the board to function well. Schaffer (2002) analysed how executives and 
non-executives came to very different interpretations of the same events, with executives 
more likely to attribute business setbacks to environmental forces than non-executives. 
While not explicitly a study of board evaluation per se, the distinction they found in the 
views of the two director-types draws attention to director bias, one of the arguments made 
for externally led evaluations.  
Minichilli, Gabrielsson and Huse (2007) developed a schema for the evaluation process, 
including identifying four “building blocks” of a system, comprising who conducted the 
evaluation; what its content should be; to whom it is addressed, that is, whether it is focused 
on internal improvements or had external audiences; and how the process unfolds in 
practical terms. This logical schema is helpful in suggesting ways practitioners can 
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undertake the process, though it stops short of providing an evidence base about the 
effectiveness of the approach.  
A broad overview of the topic by Nicholson, Kiel and Tunny (2012) shows wide 
institutional support in Asia, Europe and North America for board evaluation, mainly 
through codes of corporate governance, most annually and some “regularly”. At the time of 
their data collection, the UK was the only country listed that specifically recommended 
external facilitation; this has now grown to more than 15 countries. Their book chapter 
shows wide practitioner interest in the practice, with a list of tools and checklists for board 
evaluation in use as early as 1991.  
They also note that a “major criticism of external reviews is that they rely on the 
published statements of companies” (Nicholson et al., 2012). While it is clear that some 
companies commission reviews from corporate governance ratings firms as “external” 
sources, our experience of the practice in the UK and other territories that have followed its 
lead is that most consider external facilitation to involve a consultant involved in 
interviewing directors and observing board and committee meetings. These interventions are 
relatively expensive, which, as we will see, can be a concern to directors, and can produce 
reports containing much sensitive, qualitative information.  
Such overview studies highlight a range of options to be considered in designing board 
evaluation processes. Another stream of the literature takes a normative stance, arguing for 
certain variations and against others. In their study of board effectiveness and team 
production in small firms, Machold, Huse, Minichilli and Nordqvist (2011) suggest that 
board evaluations can be powerful tools for board development. But that is an assertion, not 
a direct outcome of their empirical work. Long (2006) draws on her experience as a 
practitioner of externally led evaluations to present a rounded view of the process options 
that highlight circumstances in which an outside facilitator can be helpful. Kiel and 
Nicholson (2005) provide a practical guide to board evaluation and a framework for doing it.  
The literature also shows anecdotal evidence of directors’ scepticism that consultants 
hired as external facilitators will have the insights necessary to understand the business or to 
get behind the façade the directors and boards may construct. In a provocative analysis, 
Wiersema and Zhang (2011) view board evaluation through a sideways study examining the 
disciplinary role that analyst interventions play in CEO dismissals. Based on those results, 
they argue that investment analysts, rather than human resources specialists or board 
consultants, may be better external evaluators of board and executive performance.  
Self or other 7 Booth & Nordberg 
Direct empirical work in the field is limited. While a handful of studies view board 
evaluation in narrow context, including sustainability actions (Aly and Mansour, 2017), 
family business (Vandebeek, Voordeckers, Lambrechts and Huybrechts, 2016), or 
assessment of board committees (Martinov-Bennie, Soh and Tweedie, 2015), none of these 
documents the benefits and drawbacks of internally guided and externally facilitated 
evaluations, as seen from the point of view of directors themselves.  
In terms of outcomes, Dulewicz and Herbert (2008) undertook a survey involving 29 
company secretaries from among the top 350 companies listed in the UK (FTSE350), 
finding that among the outcomes of the process can lead to significant changes of board 
personnel. Evaluations contributed to the resignation of directors in nearly a third of the 
cases, while gaps identified influences appointments of new directors even more frequently 
(cited in Nicholson et al., 2012). 
Rasmussen (2015) went further in a multiple case study analysis that raises questions 
whether board evaluation can measure the effectiveness, as it sets out to do. Her study shows 
evidence of the internal politics cited by Ingley and van der Walt (2002) and Schaffer 
(2002). It also calls attention to externally focused purposes of evaluation; while meant to 
enhance board accountability, evaluation can lead to political behaviour during evaluation 
and reporting about it.  
The literature we reviewed is also largely silent on other aspects of the circumstances 
under which evaluations take place. The policy initiative in the UK in particular seeks annual 
evaluations and externally facilitated ones at least every three years. But that would seem to 
lead to a schedule of appraisal based on arbitrary timing, rather than on the circumstances of 
the company and the nature of decisions a board might face. Boards might well schedule 
appraisals for quiet times, when the chance of challenge and heated debate is low and the 
chance of dysfunctional behaviour is limited. The literature also gives little insight about the 
conduct of evaluation – where it takes place, using what methods of data collection for 
which types of insights.  
This review of the literature points, therefore, to a large number of questions that need to 
be addressed to achieve the evidence-base required for appropriate corporate decisions about 
when, how and why to conduct appraisals. It also poses questions about how well suited 
regulation and public policy recommendations are to the issues they seek to address. This 
study makes an inroad in these questions by exploring the experiences and attitudes of 
directors of a range of companies working in jurisdictions broadly under the umbrella of UK 
institutions and practices: Britain itself and the Channel Islands territories where much 
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financial services activity takes place and where the authorities have been keen to press for 
high standards of corporate governance. We discuss the sample and other methodological 
considerations next before presenting the findings of this inquiry.  
Methods 
To uncover attitudes towards board evaluation and in particular towards the use of 
external facilitators, our research involved a three-stage process. In the first phase, we 
identified a range of individuals capable of providing insight into the processes of board 
evaluation. The sample was derived from amongst the contacts of the lead researcher, a 
professional working in the financial services industry in the British Channel Islands whose 
role brought contact with directors, particularly in the finance sector. These contacts were 
sent a questionnaire that set the scene of the study and primed respondents to consider issues 
of board evaluation as well as establishing the level and range of experience they had with 
the process. The process identified 17 individuals with experience as non-executive directors 
ranging from two years to 40 years. Together they hold 50 listed company directorship 
appointments, either as chair, committee chair or non-executive and almost 200 in a range of 
company-types within the finance sector from investment companies to banking. They 
divided into two groups: Those with experience of external facilitation and those who had 
undergone only board self-evaluation exercises. Of the 17 individuals, all had participated in 
annual self-evaluation process in varying forms; eight had experienced external evaluation 
and between them had undertaken 20 such exercises, three while serving as directors of 
FTSE350 companies.   
The second-phase involved semi-structured interviews conducted by the lead researcher 
of each of the 17 individuals ranging from 60 minutes to 90 minutes in length, using the 
questionnaire to prompt the line of enquiry. The interviewees were encouraged to discuss 
their considerations as to strengths and weaknesses of the processes of each self-evaluation 
and external evaluation. Where individuals had no direct experience of external evaluations 
their thoughts towards the process were not discounted as these contributed to the overall 
understanding of policy implementation. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, and 
after iterative reading of the transcriptions, sections of the texts were categorised as positive 
and negative attitudes towards both evaluation processes. 
The categories chosen in the first instance included descriptive terms drawn from the 
literature, including director attitudes towards a) the concept of and policy emphasis on 
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board evaluation, b) the benefits and shortcomings of internally orchestrated and externally 
facilitated evaluations, and c) the outcomes of the processes. In a second iteration of 
analysis, we assessed another theme that emerged during the interviews, d) the frequency of 
evaluation.    
The third phase involved boardroom observation of five stock exchange-listed 
companies on which the 17 directors are appointed. Four of these involved the annual self-
evaluation; the fifth was for a company undergoing external evaluation process. Each of the 
four company boards undertook the same self-evaluation process with a questionnaire 
completed individually by each of the board members and the results collated into a report 
and discussed in a boardroom setting. The external evaluation process included individual 
interviews between the external evaluation facilitator the directors and the company 
secretary, a review of board packs, and boardroom observation. The process culminated with 
a report on results, which was then discussed by the board. This board report was provided to 
us for this study. Implementation of suggested changes was then discussed between the lead 
researcher and the chairman. 
Whilst the size of this exploratory study is too small to form the basis for generalisation, 
the study provides insight into the use of policy within the finance sector and contributes to 
understanding of the implementation and application of the safe-guarding measure of 
evaluation adopted by the regulator as a response to corporate failings.  None of the 
companies involved is part of the FTSE350, which are subject to the recommendation of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code. Nonetheless, they engage in board evaluations as a matter 
of best practice, a sign of the growing practical significance of the process and how the 
policy has spread its influence to wider sections of the corporate landscape.  
Findings 
Central to issue of evaluation is directors’ attitudes towards the process and the policy, 
which will help to understand reasons for commitment to or resistance against the policy 
direction. We then look specifically at the emerging policy approach by considering attitudes 
towards self-assessment and external facilitation, before considering views of the outcomes 
of the process. Because of concern in UK policy, and elsewhere, about the frequency and 
scheduling of externally facilitated evaluations, we include a section on this theme in 
presenting our findings. 
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Attitudes towards evaluation and policy 
Since its revision in 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code has recommended that 
boards of large listed companies (i.e., the FTSE350) implement the annual board evaluation, 
and that external facilitators conduct them at least every three years. A quotation reflects the 
view of many of the participants:  
Director 14: Reassessment is imperative.… If there isn’t evaluation … then 
there's a risk you end up repeating mistakes or settling into bad habits and 
we know in business also that can result in the failure of the business 
especially at the board level. 
The directors in our study were not bound by this guidance, but in general they recognised 
the importance of the process. Nonetheless, two of the five companies had voluntarily 
implemented the above and a further company would be undertaking an external evaluation 
in the near future. The value placed on the option to undertake an evaluation with an external 
consultant was explained as: 
Director 6: The external board evaluator [is] there as an outside 
professional as you would use a lawyer or an accountant…. And it's good 
from time to time to have somebody say: “Well actually you could do a bit 
better if you did it that way.” Everybody can improve. 
Most felt that the external evaluation prescribed timing in the UK Corporate Governance 
code of every three years was acceptable even for smaller companies, outside of the 
FTSE350; however, some felt the cost implication was prohibitive for their smaller boards.  
For each method available to the boards to gather the qualitative data for understanding 
their performance, weaknesses and strengths, being annually through a questionnaire or 
through an external consultant, we reviewed the prevailing and pertinent perceptions of the 
participants to identify benefits and disadvantages of each method. 
Self-evaluation vs external facilitation 
When undertaking self-evaluation, each board employed a questionnaire covering a 
range of topics: board composition, meeting process, board information, training, board 
dynamics, accountability, and effectiveness, as well as an evaluation of the leadership 
qualities of the chair. The questionnaires asked the directors to rate one to three on the topics 
under review, with the lowest number relating to the director considering that improvement 
was required and the highest that no improvement was necessary. The majority of questions 
resulted in the directors scoring the highest score with no lowest scores given. Where 
directors did provide an average score comments were requested and some provided as to 
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why they considered more improvement was required. All results were put into a report to 
form the basis of the boardroom discussion.  
Some of the directors worried, however, that the use of a questionnaire format might 
lead to responses that were less than open and honest: 
Director 5: You don't have to give sufficient justification for your 
reasoning in the scoring exercise, so you don’t expose yourself to actually 
showing deficiencies…. We've done our job, we can't be criticised too 
much, we're ok, we've thought about it, now move on.  
Director 6: [You] can have situations when people aren't particularly 
honest and they want to duck the issue … [which can make self-
evaluation] a complete waste of time. 
Director 10: Board members are not necessarily going to say precisely 
what they think. 
This negative attitude towards honesty in the self-evaluation process was particularly 
associated with providing criticism of fellow directors: One of the directors explained it in 
these terms: 
Director 13: We tend to be defensive and we'll tend to … look for people 
to reinforce our own belief of our competence than actually criticise.  
However, the directors considered that the process could be improved with the application of 
open and honest responses to the questionnaire and a serious approach to the process: 
 Director 8: [Self-]evaluation has the capacity to be very helpful, but 
obviously it's very reliant on how seriously people take it. 
Director 11: [We need] a board that will say what it thinks as opposed to 
what it thinks it ought to say. 
Where directors did not consider the self-evaluation process of benefit, it was mostly when 
they felt there were no issues that needed to be raised. One explained that: 
Director 10: It's a pain in the neck…. If you have a board that works well 
together it's very easy to do, but it's always an additional burden on the 
board. 
Where directors were engaged with the process, the predominant benefit was that of 
providing time to consider their contribution to the board, the use of their skills in the 
boardroom, to allow for board composition considerations with a balance of skills and 
knowledge and as a group the weaknesses and behaviour which needed improvement: 
Director 1: A board that conducts proper evaluation is more confident in its 
behaviour and in its discharging of its duties. 
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Director 3: Without the process, you've got no way of formally identifying 
weaknesses. 
The need for open and honest evaluation was acknowledged as existing not only for the 
improvement of the performance of the board and company but also at a personal level for 
the directors. The poor performance of the board not identified through evaluation could 
ultimately lead to company failure or regulatory issues for which the individual board 
director would be culpable under their fiduciary duty: 
Director 8: Very few people see it as constructive, but the people who've 
looked at it as constructive tend to be a certain type of person who really 
understands the risk they're personally taking. 
The directors suggested that to increase the value of the self-evaluation process the design of 
the evaluation questionnaire needed to focus on company specific attributes and events as 
well as general questions for the directors to consider.  
The directors also suggested performance appraisal of the board from management and 
the company secretary, a variation on the theme of 360-degree appraisals that have become 
increasingly common in human resources management since the 1990s (Atwater and 
Waldman, 1998), though not without controversy (Waldman, Atwater and Antonioni, 1998). 
Each of the boards in our study discussed the results of their self-evaluation in a boardroom 
setting with no others present other than the company secretary.  
In all evaluation results, no criticism towards the performance of the board or chair was 
recorded, and in the open discussions no directors disclosed any inter-relational dynamics 
issues or board culture or environment changes they deemed necessary. The reluctance to 
include any comments in the self-evaluations do not appear to be specific to the boardroom 
observations as part of the study, evidenced with:  
Director 9: These evaluations have not really resulted…in [a] change in 
behaviour, individually and collectively, but it should. 
Director 12: Bringing problems out into the open can be a double-edged 
sword. You can fix them sometimes but you can also create animosity 
which doesn't go away. 
The boardroom discussions mainly focused on external relationships to the board itself, 
calling for information flow to the board to be increased in relation to their oversight role, 
for example, to monitor the actions of the managers and to be kept up-to-date with regulatory 
changes. The chair or the company secretary agreed to implement the improvements 
required.  
Self or other 13 Booth & Nordberg 
Mostly the process of self-evaluation was valued as a tool for improvement when the 
process was working well and engagement from all directors was apparent. Where the 
directors that tended to consider that their self-assessment was working well or for a few 
where they felt they were experienced board members, little requirement for an external 
evaluator was seen: 
Director 3: When you've got the vast experience…it would be total overkill 
to do it. 
Although it was more recognised that the external evaluator can assist to obtain in-depth 
opinions and valuable information more so than the self-evaluation: 
Director 5: [The external evaluator] might get down to the truth in more 
detail. 
Director 9: If we have a good questionnaire, and we have honest 
participants and constructive answers, as far as the exercise of asking the 
questions and getting the answers, internal or external doesn’t make much 
difference…..but where the external board evaluator can provide a more 
robust assessment would be where they might dig in a bit more. 
Some directors stated that they would not want to speak openly with the evaluator about 
issues they see as only relevant for the board or chair to deal with and also would not wait 
until an evaluation to do so: 
Director 12: There are issues that I would rather bring up directly with the 
board and not involve a third party. 
Director 6: I think it'd be far more likely if there …were really bad 
dynamics… individuals involved would speak to the chair…rather than 
waiting for board evaluation. 
In contrast, there may be issues that only can be discussed with an independent third party: 
Director 2: In the case of boards that may be dominated by one 
person…outside influence might be useful. 
Although there were directors who had no experience of external evaluation, they 
contributed to the attitudes towards the process. They generally felt that they would be more 
open and honest with an external evaluator than they would in a self-evaluation 
questionnaire. 
To obtain the honesty necessary for valid data collection, respondents said the external 
evaluator needs a) to be independent from the company under review, b) to be in possession 
of the necessary skills and experience to deem the results reliable, and c) to be trustworthy 
and discreet:  
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Director 8: If there is any hint that they are not discreet then people are not 
going to speak to them openly and therefore the process won’t be valuable. 
The evaluator also needs d) to know how to deliver feedback to the board with a degree of 
diplomacy, whilst also being in possession of the necessary influence and impact for the 
board members to respect their evaluation results. One director suggested that the only way 
some boards would give respect to outsiders’ suggestions for changes to their boardroom 
processes was if the evaluator acquired a status similar to that of a regulator: 
Director 14: They [the board] are top of the tree; who’s going to have an 
impact and influence over the individuals on the board? In finance only the 
regulator can perform that. 
One of the largest concerns for the directors is that the evaluator would not understand 
the company, the history of the relational dynamics within the board, or misinterpret one-off 
observation either in or outside of the boardroom, or within interviews conducted by the 
evaluator. One director explained the misinterpretation of social interaction as follows:  
Director 13: The reviewer came ... to the normal board dinner [and 
reported the board as] a bit too friendly [and queried] whether you could be 
confrontational with your fellow board members and also civil over a 
dinner table. 
The directors were also concerned that the methodology they had experienced, in which 
the evaluator observed only one board meeting, would not provide a true picture of the 
dynamics within the boardroom. The modification of behaviour that took place whilst being 
observed was explained as: 
Director 4: They [the other directors] felt they had to say something 
because they were being marked. 
There may also be a possibility that the directors could be dominated and forced by the 
chair to perform for the evaluator, evidenced as: 
Director 14: Just before the [evaluator] was invited into the room, [the 
chair] says, Look, I'll say a few things and I'm this sort of person, I expect 
this, I don’t expect this and I just want to remind you…. 
Where directors have been involved in external evaluation, positive secondary 
consequences were experienced. They felt results of the external evaluation informed the 
next annual self-evaluation and improved the process. Also, the act of deciding to allow an 
external consultant to evaluate the board led to improvements in board processes ahead of 
beginning the evaluation: 
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Director 4: [We] look at ourselves with our own self-evaluation and 
decide, do we think we could stand up to someone coming in and looking 
at us from the outside. 
The substance of this quote points to the next issue of concern. If board evaluations are 
not just window-dressing, that is, not just designed to comply with a reporting requirement, 
then what matters at least as much as process is the outcomes of the evaluation, and 
whatever differential there may be between those conducted internally or with an external 
facilitator.  
Outcomes of board evaluations 
The directors in our study generally thought there were benefits to the external 
evaluation over self-evaluation. The results were, in general, found to be useful and 
interesting. Those that had been through the process felt the peer comparison to ascertain 
advice on best practice, made possible by the facilitator’s detachment, was of high 
importance: 
Director 15: Evaluation adds enormous value because they can benchmark 
the board against other boards. 
Director 4: Someone else coming in with fresh eyes, fresh thoughts, whose 
seen other companies operating … can see that's pretty good but have you 
thought of … 
Some experienced validation of the boards existing processes and performance which 
provide for increased confidence on the board:  
Director 6: It’s not all criticism…. It is an excellent exercise which can 
really show you that the board is being run properly, [and] that you are 
considering the right things. 
Both groups of directors – those who had and had not been through the external evaluation 
process – said they placed greater value on the results of the external evaluation than that of 
the self-evaluation. It was felt the externally generated outcomes were taken more seriously. 
They were not only the advice from an expert, but because the advice had been sought and 
being paid for, the recommendations would be acted upon: 
Director 7: If you have an external report the board has to do something 
about it because it is a formal document … you would take it more 
seriously … as a more balanced view. 
Director 15: If you're paying someone to provide a service then it focuses 
your mind on actually achieving something in return for that investment. 
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The directors wanted to receive in their reports from the external evaluator not only the 
results of the observation and the interviews but ideas and pointers as to how to improve 
their performance:  
Director 6: When it's an external evaluation, there could be a list of tasks 
that we should do. 
Director 10: If they can identify things that are missing and map against 
the [corporate governance] code and come up with proper suggestions, I 
think that can be quite helpful. 
In contrast some felt the suggestions for improvement that had been received were not of 
significance, evidenced by this comment: 
Director 13: Didn’t give us any concrete points to change the board, there 
were a few comments we took on board, but it really didn’t help. 
The directors considered that there was benefit to employing an external evaluator, if the 
evaluator had the experience and approached the process to obtain significant suggestions for 
change that were at both the board and at an individual level to understand the board and the 
directors contribution: 
Director 15: Are there behaviours that you as an individual are 
introducing…is the company successful despite your behaviour rather than 
because of it? 
Frequency of reviews 
In relation to the use of an external facilitator for board evaluation, directors were 
willing to extend the code’s recommendation of external evaluators beyond the FTSE350: 
Director 17: [External evaluation is] a source of best practice that even 
smaller companies should aspire to, so on that basis I wouldn't see any 
reason to remove something just because the company isn’t big enough for 
FTSE350. 
The frequency in the code was largely considered to be correct at three years, even for 
smaller companies, though with some reservations: 
Director 14: Reassessment is imperative … if there isn’t evaluation … then 
there's a risk you end up repeating mistakes or settling into bad habits and 
we know in business also that can result in the failure of the business 
especially at the board level. 
Director 14: If you're just in a constant cycle of … assessment … you'll 
never anything done. 
However, there was a concern over cost to meet the code when the board considered the 
necessity as not there: 
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Director 11: The question I have is whether or not the cost is justified.  
There is a view that it should be done every three and I’ve spoken to 
investors and they get quite upset of the fact.  If they feel that the Board is 
doing a good job, why should they have to cough up anything from 
GBP10,000 to GBP15,000 every three years when they’re totally happy.   
 The flexibility of the code provides the ability to, where there were issues identified, the 
frequency of external evaluation could be reconsidered and evaluations conducted more as 
needs dictated, rather than according to a fixed schedule: 
Director 17: When specific issues have been identified and there is room 
for improvement there shouldn’t be any reason why there shouldn't be a 
follow-up with a further evaluation the next year. 
But the frequency did need to be carefully considered and not just applied to meet the code 
with a suggestion that shareholders be invited to opine as to whether they would agree to the 
board being externally evaluated, which would allow for increased shareholder engagement 
and inversely shareholder accountability: 
Director 11: I wonder whether or not it would be appropriate if a circular to 
all investors was done prior to an external Board evaluation and the cost 
incurred?  
Discussion 
The literature suggests that directors were initially reluctant to recognise the importance 
of evaluation, even though it had been identified in policy post-Enron, examined in 
theorising by Ingley and van der Walt (2002), and advocated for practice by Long (2006). 
Our inquiry, however, indicates that 10 years after the onset of the financial crisis, and after 
even firmer policy direction, directors’ attitudes have transformed. They accept that 
evaluations have an important role in enhancing board performance. This acceptance has the 
indirect but important benefit of contributing to and ensuring company continuity beyond the 
current directors’ tenure. Our research also validates an observation in Rebeiz (2016) that the 
benefits of evaluation depend on the commitment to the process by their fellow directors.  
This shift to accept evaluation could be attributable to two main factors: high profile 
corporate governance failures and longevity of implementation. In the 2008 failure of the 
UK banking group HBOS Plc, investigation by the regulator uncovered boardroom 
behavioural dynamics that demonstrated that boards’ actions and behaviours can directly 
affect company performance (Bank of England, 2015). It is worth noting that our research 
found little evidence that behavioural dynamics are discussed during a board’s self-
evaluation process, but external evaluators were sensitive to them.   
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The second factor contributing to the attitude shift may be due to the longevity and 
frequency of the application of the requirements for evaluation under the UK code. The UK 
acceptance of evaluation is in contrast to a similar study of Norwegian corporate governance 
abiding companies by Rasmussen (2015), which may be attributable to the evaluation 
requirements of the Norwegian corporate governance code not specifying the frequency or 
necessity of annual or external evaluations. It would be interesting to look into the attitudes 
of different boards abiding to different corporate governance codes with differing evaluation 
guidance to ascertain whether this link between requirements and acceptance is general and 
valid. 
Our respondents’ attitudes towards evaluation carried out by an external consultant 
seemed to be shifting; they acknowledge the importance of their role, but acceptance is not 
universal. Directors in our study remained reluctant to accept that outsiders could understand 
the specific boardroom environment and identify and make valid suggestions for improved 
board performance. There was agreement that greater acceptance of the professionalism of 
the sector would be obtained with a code of practice (Pitcher, 2014). Such a draft exists; 
however, there is no regulatory backing and standardisation of the approach to evaluation 
practitioners has not yet been achieved.  
The research uncovered difficulties in the process of self-evaluation as well. These were 
identified as lack of defined purpose ahead of commencing the evaluation; inability to 
identify dysfunctional behavioural dynamics; lack of independence to remain impartial and 
reluctance to voice concerns; and an inability to assess against peers. These deficits mean the 
results of self-evaluation are not a true reflection of the board environment. Importantly, 
evaluation results were not acted upon and very few suggestions for change were 
implemented. 
Difficulties identified during self-evaluation may be overcome by employing an 
evaluation practitioner who has increased skills and experience that an internal reviewer may 
not possess (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). However, this study suggests that process 
facilitators can contribute their own difficulties. Utilising an external evaluator brings a 
degree of independence and objectivity, but their work is still subjective and interpretivist, as 
in other ethnographic research. 
This study shows that the self-evaluation processes we examined did not involve the 
initial purpose and extent of the evaluation, a starting point deemed relevant to add validity 
(Minichilli et al., 2007). This is in contrast to the examples of external evaluation our 
respondents described. As with other engagements of professional consultants, mandates 
Self or other 19 Booth & Nordberg 
given to external evaluators defined the purpose and extent of the exercise. Doing so 
provided relevancy to the results.   
To overcome the difficulties in self-evaluation, the results suggest that external 
evaluators need the ability to identify and classify behavioural dynamics, the decision-
making culture (Bailey and Peck, 2013;Huse, 2005;Samra-Fredericks, 2000), group 
psychology processes (Merchant and Pick, 2010), and the emotional energies in the 
boardroom (Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008). These are factors not generally included in self-
evaluation; and, as Bollich et al. (2015) explain, they are difficult to detect by those directly 
involved.  
In our research, directors said they had received no individual feedback during self-
evaluations of boards, though in the cases of employee appraisals and group activities the 
human resources literature shows such individual reflection leads to improved performance 
(Church, 1997;Duval and Lalwani, 1999;London, Larsen and Thisted, 1999). Through 
interviews and boardroom observation, an external evaluator may be better placed to build a 
picture of the current performance of a board and individual directors, and to provide 
feedback on issue that need to be addressed. The independence afforded to them ensures that 
they are less inclined than in self-evaluation to perform errors of omission (Caputo and 
Dunning, 2005). 
These results can form objectives for the following year (Conger et al., 1998;Rasmussen, 
2015), which our research discovered were not always an outcome of the self-evaluation 
process but arose in particular where an external evaluation process had been undertaken. 
The evaluator can also assist the chair to facilitate the changes considered as necessary for a 
better functioning board, as part of the developmental function of evaluation (Rasmussen, 
2015).  
The identified internal and external evaluation weakness that the processes do not hold 
the board accountable for implementing the changes they consider to be relevant and 
necessary. Our findings also chime with research showing that board and group culture tends  
to come from the chair (McNulty, Pettigrew, Jobome and Morris, 2011;Neubauer, 1997) and 
where change was necessary the directors would look to the chair for implementation 
(Reicher, Haslam and Hopkins, 2005;Leblanc, 2005). This suggests that external facilitators 
can grow into somewhat larger roles that can enhance their understanding of the company 
and its special circumstances. With such increased involvement comes the risk they will 
gradually become insiders. If their role has the ability to influence change on the board much 
in the way a  regulator can, as Director 14 suggested, then increasing involvement in 
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implementation might increase the risk of a new form of regulatory capture (cf. Baxter, 
2011). 
Should boards be given greater flexibility over the timing of board evaluations, even 
more than the comply-or-exchange regime permits? Doing so might make them less tied to 
the reporting and less hostage to the tick-box mentality (FRC, 2012) that has become 
attached to the UK Corporate Governance Code in general, and to similar regimes in other 
countries. This study suggests, however, that directors welcome the prescribed frequency of 
once every three years because it reduces subjectivity and helps them overcome the priorities 
of their chair, especially when a domineering character holds the role. This level of comfort 
of prescribed external evaluation extends to shareholders insofar as an account of the 
evaluation is published in the accounts, allowing the shareholders to look beyond the 
company results and into the workings of the board. Although not part of this study, current 
reporting on evaluation is generally considered very basic and further research into 
evaluation disclosure to shareholders and stakeholders could be undertaken. 
Limitations and implications for research 
This is a small study of boards of mainly smaller companies, which makes it difficult to 
generalise the findings across the wide range of companies now engaging in board 
evaluation. However, the nascent literature on this field needs studies like this to frame the 
issues, understand the attitudes of directors, and see how those attitudes develop as they 
become increasingly familiar with the task. These observations suggest a variety of avenues 
for future exploratory and confirmatory research to help us stay abreast of the evolving 
practice and to inform further public policy initiatives.  
Because research into board evaluation is at an early stage, we are still in need of 
identifying the right questions to ask before we can develop theories to explain how the 
process works and how it differs, for example, from employee performance management or 
the psychology of workgroups and project teams. Our study has detected some of the 
practices, but its scale is too small to suggest we have any more than scratched the surface of 
the full variety of ways in which boards conduct such activities.  
We have seen evidence of questionnaire-based information gathering, of interviews and 
board observations that feed into the evaluation. We have seen evidence of group meetings 
to discuss the outcomes, and we heard of findings left undiscussed and unacted upon. 
Practice-level research, examining the artefacts and rituals of board evaluation, would give 
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us better insights into how the process embeds itself, and what leads the process towards 
successful discovery or down the path to stale routine.  
The literature suggests board evaluation is seen as a powerful and also a neglected tool 
in the quest for improved board and firm performance. The literature we reviewed provides 
much advice about conducting board evaluations, but little evidence. And just as the links 
between effectiveness and performance are complex, as Forbes and Milliken (1999) and 
those that followed it have described, the links between evaluation and effectiveness need 
exploration as well, so we can understand what factors matter.  
The study gives us some pointers, however. Many of the antecedents, process elements, 
and outcomes that contribute to board effectiveness are coming to be understood, and 
enhanced disclosure is making data available to help assess, for example, the effort norms of 
boards and the balance of knowledge and skills on the boards. But the evaluation process, 
and the board evaluators themselves, gives insights into the interpersonal relations of 
directors, and to the characteristics of directors themselves, their traits and biases. Do 
directors exhibit, for example, the persuasiveness that Leblanc and Gillies (2005) associate 
with directors of successful boards, or the cultural intelligence (Earley, 2002) and sensitivity 
to other directors it seems to imply (Charas, 2015)? Understanding these factors might help 
boards and directors cope with the tensions between cognitive conflict and board 
cohesiveness that Forbes and Milliken (1999) highlight. It is difficult to gain access to study 
such matters in corporate boards, to be sure. Yet as a proxy, research might be conducted, 
confidentially and with great discretion, in public sector boards, where a greater inclination 
towards openness to external scrutiny is likely.  
Implications for practice and policy 
Our study also has implications for the practice of boards and evaluators, and for policy 
and regulation. We spoke with directors of mainly small companies, smaller than those at 
whom the policy of external evaluation is directed. They generally found something valuable 
in the process, in particular when an external evaluator was present and when that person 
was sufficiently grounded in the company’s business to understand the nuances. This 
suggests something about the character and skills needed by board evaluators. Given the 
direction of travel in policy, the number of board evaluators seems set to rise.  
The knowledge and skills of evaluators that seem so valued now may already be rather 
scarce, suggesting a need to develop new greater capabilities of evaluators as well as more 
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capacity for board evaluation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many large company boards 
have resisted the entreaties of large management consultancies, accountancy firms, and 
headhunters to fill the gap, preferring instead the help of boutique board evaluation firms. 
The practices they follow are less than fully understood, so understanding their approach to 
evaluation as well as boards may be important. Some of the suggestions in this study point to 
a role for a professional body to certify evaluators and thus provide the trust identified 
directors require. This acceptance by boards of the experience and qualification of evaluators 
would then lead to acceptance of the evaluation results and implementation of improvement 
suggestions. In the meantime, even our modest study suggests a need for the 
professionalisation of practice, and with it some certification, if not perhaps standardisation.  
There is a danger – evident in the literature as well as in the undercurrent of our 
directors’ thinking – that the routinisation of board evaluation may induce what Westphal 
and Zajac (1998) call the symbolic management in corporate relations with the shareholders, 
that is, the manipulation of compliance tasks and disclosure to misrepresent activities 
undertaken. Corporate governance ratings firms already target board evaluation reporting as 
an element in their compliance rankings. Such metrics have worked their way into the 
portfolio management exercises of asset management firms and into the interrogation of 
directors by investment analysts and those engaged in monitoring environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) issues. The impact for public accountability for private conversations 
looms large in this field, and we understood, as yet, so little about it. The chances for 
unintended consequences from policy decisions need careful thought. Would further 
disclosure on the inner workings of the board lead to smaller, currently out-of-scope firms 
choosing not to implement what is starting to be seen as best practice? And if so would they 
be missing out on the opportunity to obtain professional advice as to become more effective 
decision-making groups? 
Conclusions 
Board evaluation is clearly an important topic, with value for practitioners, 
policymakers, and researchers. But it is also one that is difficult to research empirically. This 
study contributes to our understanding by exploring the attitudes of directors who have 
undertaken multiple board evaluations and experienced the benefits from having done so. It 
suggests sometimes grudging acceptance of the value of externally facilitated exercises, in 
particular for their ability to detect the dynamics of director interactions to achieve increased 
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performance to which self-evaluation seems structurally blind. The directors in our study 
acknowledged both social sensitivity and industry- and firm-specific understanding as 
important criteria to generate value from the exercise and trust in the evaluator.  
Further research is needed, therefore, to understand what parts of the process are largely 
independent of such industry- and firm-level knowledge to add value. Doing so would help 
practitioners develop the skills needed to meet the growing demand for external facilitation 
that seems inevitable from the policy direction. This study points us towards developing 
greater understanding of the interplay between the social characteristics of directors, the 
dynamics of the boardroom that result from them, and how those dynamics contribute to 
board effectiveness, that is, to open the black box a crack. Given the difficulties of 
conducting board research, the developing practice of board evaluation may shed light on 
that darkness.  
 
                                                 
1
 After a more general search for literature on board evaluation and related terms using 
Google and EBSCO Business Source Complete, we undertook a targeted search of the 
Scopus database for the phrases “board evaluation” or “board apprais” or “board assessm” in 
title, abstracts or keywords of articles, conference papers and book chapters in business and 
management. These three terms have come to be the standard ones used in academic 
discussion of the practice. It yielded just 40 papers, the first in 1987 and running until the 
end of 2016. After filtering for relevance, only 29 papers remained, the earliest from 1997, 
and just 13 were empirically based, whether quantitative or qualitative in approach. This 
paper draws upon those and our wider searches to include other key studies, articles in 
professional journals and papers by consulting firms to achieve a more rounded view. 
Nonetheless the narrowness of the literature demonstrates the limited scholarly attention 
board evaluation has received to date.  
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